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LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW
OF THE REGULATORY STATE:
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Milton C. Regan, Jr.* & Kath Hall**
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen increasing attention to the human rights impacts
of transnational business operations.1 The 2011 United Nations (UN)
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“the Principles”), for
instance, state: “Business enterprises should respect human rights. This
means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved.”2 The Principles describe this duty as not binding, but not
voluntary.3 At the same time, imposing responsibility for adverse human
rights impacts has been hampered by the absence of an international
sovereign that can impose and enforce legally binding obligations. In
addition, the effectiveness of national regulation may be weakened by
differences in the quality of legal systems or the inability to reach conduct
beyond a country’s borders.
One response to these challenges has been the rise of a system of
transnational “governance.” The term “governance” incorporates the
network of actors, instruments, and mechanisms that to varying degrees
regulate transnational corporations apart from formally authoritative state

* McDevitt Professor of Jurisprudence and Codirector, Center for the Study of the Legal
Profession, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is part of a larger colloquium
entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham University School of Law. For
an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword: Lawyering in the
Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
** Associate Professor, Australian National University College of Law; Deputy Director,
Transnational Research Institute on Corruption. This Article is a shorter version of a
working paper prepared for the Fordham colloquium, available on SSRN at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711011 [https://perma.cc/T65F-3EHJ].
1. See infra Part I.
2. U.N. Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 13, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter
UN Guiding Principles].
3. U.N. Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, Frequently Asked Questions
About the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 9, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/14/3
(2014) (discussing the legal status of the Principles).
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laws.4 The actors within this system include international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), industry and professional
organizations, and private sector service providers. The regulatory
instruments include both “hard law” that is legally binding and “soft law”
that is designed to influence behavior through more informal mechanisms.5
This system of governance differs from conventional legal regulation in that
both public and private actors are involved in rule formation, many
provisions are voluntary, there often is no formal penalty for violations, and
anticipated financial or reputational concerns sometimes may be the most
significant determinant of behavior.
In light of these differences, we ask what, if any, role is there for lawyers
to advise business clients on human rights? Is there a legal duty to respect
human rights? Does the answer to that question determine whether a
company looks to lawyers for advice on human rights issues, as opposed to
seeking advice from management consultants or other professionals who
advise on corporate social responsibility or sustainability?
In this Article, we begin to explore such questions by drawing on
interviews6 with twenty-nine lawyers involved in the business and human
rights field. These interviews indicate that awareness of the range of
governance initiatives that exist in this area still is limited to a relatively
small group of elite lawyers and that even amongst these lawyers, there is
no consistent approach being adopted to providing advice on the issues.
Whereas some lawyers are finding regular opportunities to raise concerns
about human rights impacts of their client’s operations, others are still
developing a systematic approach to providing this advice. Advising clients
on human rights issues is easiest when their impact potentially creates legal
liability. However, even in cases involving nonbinding standards, lawyers
may advise on reputational and illegal impacts, or alert clients that
standards indicate an emerging consensus on issues that may eventually be
incorporated into “hard law.” Finally, multinational companies and those
with extended supply chains are especially likely to want advice on the full
range of human rights issues relevant to their operations. This may include
advice on potential criticism by NGOs, customers, investors, shareholders,
or other stakeholders. While lawyers have no professional monopoly on
identifying such risks, they may be in an especially advantageous position
to warn companies about them. This may particularly be the case for inside
counsel, although outside counsel also contribute to this process. In these
ways, lawyers are beginning to play an important role in strengthening the
system of transnational governance that regulates business and human
rights.
In setting the background to our discussion of lawyers’ role in this
context, Part I of this Article provides a general overview of the emergence
of the transnational governance regime. Part II then describes some of the

4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra Part II.
6. The interviews are on file with the authors.
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governance instruments that attempt to prevent and rectify the adverse
human rights impacts of business activities. Part III discusses the extent to
which lawyers are advising their business clients on human rights issues,
the factors that may inhibit or encourage the provision of such advice, and
how the lawyers who are raising these issues are framing these discussions
with their clients. Finally, Part IV suggests further areas of inquiry that
may enrich our understanding of the role that lawyers can play in helping
construct a transnational governance regime on business and human rights.
I. THE GROWTH OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNANCE
This part discusses the dynamics that have prompted greater economic
globalization over the last few decades and how this trend has prompted
efforts to hold transnational businesses accountable for the impacts of their
operations.
Part I.A describes how public policies, technological
innovation, and corporate strategies have resulted in business activities that
increasingly span multiple national boundaries. Part I.B discusses how
divergence in regulation among different countries both creates
opportunities for business advantage and prompts efforts to achieve some
degree of transnational regulatory convergence. Finally, Part I.C describes
the system of transnational governance that has emerged, which reflects a
combination of actors and initiatives that aim to address the impacts of
transnational business operations.
A. Intensifying Economic Globalization
Over the last few decades, transnational governance efforts have occurred
against the backdrop of public policies that have focused on removing
formal trade barriers, capital market restrictions, and national regulation
that create obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, and
investment.7 These policies reflect the belief that the best way to achieve
economic progress in many developing countries is by focusing on an
export strategy that capitalizes on the lower costs of labor and other
resources within these jurisdictions.8 In particular, during the last decades
of the twentieth century, declining communication and transportation costs,
along with improved logistics technology, significantly increased the
potential for globally integrated markets.9 As a result, more companies
developed business activities around the world. Manufacturing companies
in particular began to move parts of their operations to jurisdictions with
lower costs and less demanding regulatory regimes.
7. See generally ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE
MARKETS: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES (2006).
8. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
9. See GLENN MORGAN, PEER HULL KRISTENSEN & RICHARD WHITLEY, THE
MULTINATIONAL FIRM: ORGANIZING ACROSS INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL DIVIDES 287–88
(2001); SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALIZATION (2011); JOHN
RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, at xxvii–xxx (2013).
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Around the same time, the structure of operations in many major
companies began to move from mass production and consumption toward
differentiated markets and flexible production. This led many companies to
reduce their investment in fixed assets and to move toward reliance on
outside suppliers that are able to configure their products in response to
changes in market conditions. As a result, operating models developed that
involved networks of multiple entities in supply chains that stretched across
several countries. These networks involved a move toward a production
process that focused on subsidiaries and independent contractors, each
contributing specific inputs at various stages along the supply chain. Many
contractors also developed their own supply chains by subcontracting out
portions of the process for which they were responsible. In some cases,
large companies completely abandoned any involvement in the production
of their goods, instead focusing on marketing products and maintaining a
corporate image with which their consumers could easily identify.
Such developments did not automatically enable companies to operate
seamlessly across jurisdictions. Instead, the reduction of trade and
technological barriers revealed a world of multiple legal systems that
imposed differing, and at times conflicting, legal demands. As Sol
Picciotto puts it, “Th[e] shift towards more ‘open’ national economies did
not create a unified and free world market but, like an outgoing tide, it
revealed a craggy landscape of diverse national and local regulations.”10
Tim Buthe and Walter Matli observe that national differences in product
standards became more visible and more economically important “because
they now impeded trade in goods that few had even thought of exporting or
importing previously, when transport costs and tariffs had made trade
prohibitively costly.”11 As a result, companies faced a world of regulatory
divergence with differing regulations on environmental impacts, labor
conditions, securities disclosures, insolvency, sales practices, data privacy,
intellectual property protection, investment conditions, and many other
issues within each jurisdiction in which they operate.
B. Regulatory Divergence and Convergence
The existence of differences between national legal systems opened up
opportunities for companies to benefit from regulatory divergence even as it
simultaneously created pressure for regulatory convergence. Transnational
companies benefit from divergence by locating activities in jurisdictions
with the fewest constraints on the pursuit of profitability. Countries often
compete vigorously for foreign investment by tailoring their regulatory
regimes to the needs of such companies. The result can be the proverbial

10. PICIOTTO, supra note 9, at 10.
11. TIM BUTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 134 (2011).
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“race to the bottom,” in which jurisdictions with the least onerous
regulatory demands capture the most investment.12
While the transnational company can benefit from regulatory divergence,
its global operations also require a certain amount of regulatory
convergence. A company subject to multiple conflicting legal demands as
it moves goods, services, and capital across jurisdictions can incur
substantial administrative costs in meeting these demands. Furthermore,
officials in different countries may possess varying amounts of discretion in
interpreting and enforcing national laws, based on political and cultural
considerations that are opaque to outsiders. This can introduce considerable
unpredictability for a company that is attempting to allocate capital among
competing internal operations and to assess the performance of multiple
profit centers based on common metrics. At least some degree of
regulatory convergence across jurisdictions is necessary to reduce this
threat.
Large law firms benefit from both regulatory divergence and
convergence. With respect to divergence, a firm’s familiarity with the law
enables it to advise on how a particular jurisdiction’s legal regime will
affect a company’s operations and to assist a client to structure business
activities so as to comply with the relevant legal requirements. It also
enables the firm to advise on the legal risks that a company may face by
organizing its operations in certain ways and the remedies that should be
available if its investment is threatened. This enables companies to
calculate the expected costs and benefits of locating operations in different
jurisdictions and assists managers in maximizing financial returns across a
system of divergent regulatory demands.
Lawyers can also be involved in activities aimed at achieving regulatory
convergence. In particular, there has been a growing focus on the creation
of rules, standards, and guidelines that are applicable across national
borders. While these instruments may be created by law firms, more often,
lawyers advise and assist international organizations, NGOs, industry
bodies, and private service providers to develop standards aimed at
convergence. These efforts enhance the ability of companies to operate
across multiple boundaries by making the environment in which they
operate more predictable, even though some differences may remain. Such
uniformity enables companies to assess with greater precision the
profitability of various activities across the globe, thereby improving their
ability to efficiently allocate capital.
Harmonizing rules and standards across borders can also contribute to a
company’s “social license” to operate in various countries.13 This
increasingly important license reflects community support for a company’s
12. For an empirical analysis of the complex consequences of this phenomenon, see
NINA RUDRA, GLOBILIZATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
WHO REALLY GETS HURT? (2008).
13. NEIL A. GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND
ENVIRONMENT 36 (2003); JOHN MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENSE: HOW TO KEEP YOUR
ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE 8–13 (2014).
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activities based on the perception that those activities are legitimate and in
accordance with basic notions of justice. Failing to obtain such support can
be costly for a company. These costs may include consumer boycotts,
drops in share price, increases in the cost of capital, damage to reputation,
or host country reluctance to approve investments or projects.14
The results of efforts by lawyers and others to achieve regulatory
convergence form part of the emerging system of transnational governance.
This system has various features that distinguish it from conventional
government regulation.
In particular, in the absence of a single
transnational regulatory body, both public and private entities are now
involved in creating binding and nonbinding instruments that seek to
establish common rules and standards to govern transnational commercial
activities.
C. Systems of Transnational Governance
In the absence of an international sovereign with regulatory authority
over global corporate activities, transnational actors have increasingly
looked to other forms of “law making” that can create what Niklas
Luhmann calls “a social system which depends upon the congruent
generalisation of normative behavioral expectations.”15 The result has been
the development of systems of “transnational governance” in areas such as
sale of goods, insurance, insolvency, intellectual property, environmental
protection, anticorruption, and human rights.16
These systems of transnational governance have several distinctive
features. First, transnational governance involves a range of both public
and private actors. These generally include international organizations,
NGOs, industry groups, professional organizations, private sector service
providers (including lawyers), and major corporations. This means that, as
Jennifer Green puts it, “[T]he right to make rules is not restricted to
states.”17 Authority in this setting arises not from formal legal delegation,
but from the willingness of others to be bound by a party’s guidance. As
Green argues, “[W]hen actors consent to be bound by rules, they create
authority.”18 Such consent largely rests on the legitimacy of the actor,
which in turn is based on qualities such as technical expertise, an inclusive

14. See generally MORRISON, supra note 13.
15. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 82 (2d ed. 2014).
16. For overviews of this phenomenon, see generally JAN-CHRISTOPHE GRAZ &
ANDREAS NOLKE, TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS LIMITS (2008);
GOVERNANCE ACROSS BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL FIELDS AND TRANSVERSAL THEMES 17–19
(Leonhard Dobusch, Philip Mader & Cigrid Quack eds., 2013); HANDBOOK OF
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 30 (Thomas Hale & David
Held eds., 2011); NETWORKED GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, AND THE LAW
262 (Mark Fenwick, Steven Van Uystel & Stefan Wrbka eds., 2014); TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 139 (Marie-Laure Djelic &
Kierstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006).
17. JESSICA F. GREEN, RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS
IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 29 (2014).
18. Id. at 27.
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deliberative process, or a dominant position in a relevant market. Thus,
“[A]uthority need not be legally binding to gain adherents. If private actors
are able to legitimate their claims to authority, others will voluntarily adopt
the rules. Potential governors then acquire authority and become governors
in fact.”19
Second, transnational rules and standards develop in a range of less
formal contexts than those in which traditional governmental regulation
occurs. Martin Haajer and Hendrik Wagenaar suggest that “there is a move
from the familiar topography of formal political institutions to the edges of
organizational activity, negotiations between sovereign bodies, and interorganizational networks that challenged the established distinction between
public and private.”20
Thus, gatherings convened by international
organizations and NGOs, industry conferences, meetings of professional
associations, and informal communications among actors in various
networks are all possible sites where ideas are proposed, developed, and
refined.
Third, transnational governance regimes incorporate a range of binding
and nonbinding instruments including national and international laws,
industry and commercial standards, corporate codes of conduct, and
guidelines issued by international organizations and professional bodies.
The nature and effect of these instruments is not as sharp as the distinction
between hard and soft law.21 For instance, compliance with voluntary
standards is often monitored by NGOs, consumer groups, and investment
consultants who may then criticize a company for noncompliance. This can
serve as a form of informal enforcement, with serious financial and
reputational consequences flowing from it.
Companies may also incorporate voluntary standards into their contracts
with retailers and manufacturers, so that failure to comply with the
standards can be a basis for future termination. Voluntary standards and
19. Id. at 30. Some transnational actors also acquire authority and legitimacy through
invocation of universal principles such as justice or human rights. NGOs in particular often
gain influence by publicizing the harms imposed by transnational business operations, or by
criticizing the actions of suppliers or joint venture partners. This publicity then can lead to
actions such as calls for boycotts or other consumer action. In recent years, these actions
have resulted in corporate concern for its reputation and have frequently prompted changes
in management policy and practice. See, e.g., SHELL GROUP, PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: DOES
THERE HAVE TO BE A CHOICE? (1998); Paul Lewis, Blood and Oil: A Special Report: After
Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends Its Record, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/13/world/blood-and-oil-a-special-report-after-nigeriarepresses-shell-defends-its-record.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/E3ED-37C2].
20. Maarten Hajer & Hendrik Wagenaar, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY 3 (Maarten Hajer &
Hendrik Wagenaar eds., 2003).
21. While there is not complete agreement about the meaning of these terms, one
prominent overview maintains that hard law “refers to legally binding obligations that are
precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations)
and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.” Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421
(2000). By contrast, “[t]he realm of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened
along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation.” Id. at 422.

2008

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

principles may become sufficiently accepted that they are incorporated into
national legislation. Finally, transnational rules and norms can circulate
throughout networks, with various actors incorporating them into their
practices in ways that reinforce their influence. Thus, as Sigrid Quack has
observed, transnational lawmaking “represents global institution building
that involves continuous transformations between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’
regulation.”22
Finally, transnational governance operates primarily through networks of
loosely connected actors rather than in top-down, command-and-control
fashion. Sol Picciotto suggests that the network metaphor expresses “[t]he
destabilization of normative hierarchy” and reflects the absence of a unified
sovereign with undisputed regulatory authority over transnational
activities.23 Saskia Sassen argues that transnational governance is creating
“new assemblages of authority, rights and power and . . . diverse
jurisdictional geographies” that unsettle national and international
authority.24 As Picciotto notes, this central feature of governance
distinguishes the post-liberal from the classical liberal system.25 In the
latter, legal rules fell into relatively clear categories and hierarchies, with
international law binding states and national or local law governing legal
persons.26 This made it possible, at least in principle, to determine the
validity of rules and to decide which should apply in a particular situation.
In networked governance, normative systems overlap and interpenetrate
each other and the determination of the legitimacy of an activity under any
one system is rarely definitive, as powerful actors may be able to challenge
it by reference to another system. The result is that “in this ‘network
society’ the public and the private, which were never truly separate social
spheres, have become harder to distinguish, and their interactions and
permutations have become more complex.”27
An important consequence of the networked nature of transnational
governance is what Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers describe as
The recursive process involves ongoing exchange,
“recursivity.”28
contestation, negotiation, and revision of norms among the international,
national, and local level. Various actors compete to have their respective
descriptions and diagnoses become the accepted way to identify what is
labeled as a “problem.” This has ramifications for which measures are seen
as appropriate responses, as well as which actors are best situated to take
the lead in addressing the problem. The concept of recursivity thus
22. Sigrid Quack, Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of
Distributed Agency, 14 ORGANIZATION 643, 644 (2007).
23. See PICOTTO, supra note 9, at 17.
24. See generally SASKIA SASSON, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
25. See PICOTTO, supra note 9, at 13.
26. See id. at 28.
27. Id. at 8.
28. See generally Terence C. Halliday & Bruce C. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law:
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Industry
Regimes, 112 AJS 1135 (2007).

2016]

TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

2009

“replaces a global-centric, top-down concept of norms traveling from the
center to the periphery with a dynamic, recursive process of exchange and
negotiation between transnational, national, and even local norms.”29
II. BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
This part discusses the increasing attention to the human rights impacts
of business operations over the last few decades and the initiatives that have
resulted from such attention. Part II.A describes some of the major events
that served to heighten awareness of the risk to human rights from business
activities. Part II.B describes the major international instruments that
address human rights in general, while Part II.C focuses on the leading
global programs that address human rights in the context of business
operations.
A. The Growing Attention to Business and Human Rights
The development of a transnational governance regime focused on
business and human rights developed out of a growing global awareness of
the possible human rights impacts of business activities. A number of
global events led to this awareness. One of the earliest was the December
1984 gas leak at Union Carbide’s pesticide plant in Bhopal, India.30 Union
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was 50.9 percent owned by a U.S. parent
company and 49.1 percent owned by Indian banks and private
shareholders.31 The leak resulted in methyl isocyanate circulating through
the shanty towns surrounding the plant, causing almost 3800 confirmed
deaths and another 3900 permanent severely disabling injuries.32 One study
found that the spontaneous abortion rate and the still birth rates in the area
following the gas leak were more than three times the national average.33
The effects of the disaster on the U.S. parent company were significant.
Six months after the leak, the New York Times reported that Union Carbide
had “seen its stock plummet, its financial health challenged by multi-billion
dollar lawsuits and the pace of its strategic acquisitions slow due to
problems in raising cash.”34 Numerous lawsuits alleging common law tort
violations were filed by victims in the United States and India at both the

29. TERRENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 693
(2015).
30. INGRID ECKERMAN, THE BHOPAL SAGA 3 (2004); see also KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY
AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS (2001).
31. See RUGGIE, supra note 9, at 6–8.
32. ECKERMAN, supra note 30.
33. Id. at 3; FORTUN, supra note 30.
34. Stuart Diamond, Warren Anderson: A Public Crisis, a Personal Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/19/business/warren-anderson-a-publiccrisis-a-personal-ordeal.html [http:// perma.cc/L58H-HEE5].
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state and federal levels.35 In 1989, Union Carbide made a payment of $470
million, which was criticized as severely inadequate.36
The catastrophic consequences of the disaster prompted some of the first
global efforts to frame business responsibility in terms of international
human rights. Several national and international NGOs were established,
some of which still focus on providing assistance to the victims today.37
Attempts were also made to respond to the regulatory gap in corporate
liability for harms caused overseas. For example, the Charter on Industrial
Hazards (“the Charter”) was created to “reflect the views and concerns of
persons injured and distressed by industrial hazards.”38 The Charter was
finalized in 1996 and invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and several other
relevant international human rights instruments.39
Other early cases that focused attention on the impacts of business
activities in the extractive industry included Royal Dutch Shell’s operations
in the 1980s and early 1990s in the Ogoniland area of Nigeria40 and
Talisman Energy’s operations in Sudan.41 Growing public attention also
was drawn to allegations of human rights abuses in large global supply
chains. Nike was one of the first manufacturing companies to face this
scrutiny due to the outsourcing of all of its production into Asia. Problems
within Nike’s supplier factories included low wages, abusive and unsafe
working conditions, and the use of child labor. The result was a that the
company became “a poster child for corporate villainy,”42 with violent
strikes at several factories and protests over the sale of Nike products in
twenty-eight U.S. states and twelve countries.
The result of the widespread campaign against Nike was increased
awareness of labor conditions in global supply chains. It also brought
together labor and consumer advocates and marked the emergence of a
significant transnational NGO network that continues to monitor and
publicize the human rights impacts of business operations.43 Mobilization
of these groups demonstrated the major impact that widespread publicity
could have on a company’s reputation. Many subsequent consumer
35. Id.
36. Sanjoy Hazarika, Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million, N.Y
TIMES (Feb. 15, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/15/business/bhopal-payments-byunion-carbide-set-at-470-million.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/58Y6-R33L].
37. ECKERMAN, supra note 30, at 3–4.
38. GLOB. POLICY FORUM, CHARTER ON INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS, https://www.
globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45285.html [http://perma.cc/Z2AV-XGBY].
39. Id.
40. RUGGIE, supra note 9, at 9–14.
41. PENELOPE SIMMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 22–78 (2014).
42. Michael Connor, Corporate Responsibility at a Tipping Point, BUS. ETHICS (Jan. 24,
2010), http://business-ethics.com/2010/01/24/2154-nike-corporate-responsibility-at-a-tipping
-point// [https://perma.cc/7TMY-GHE2].
43. See George H. Sage, Justice Do It! The Nike Transnational Advocacy Network:
Organization, Collective Actions, and Outcomes, 16 SOC. SPORT 205 (1999).
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boycotts and “naming and shaming” campaigns against major companies
followed the template established during the activities directed at Nike.
By 2007, it was clear that human rights abuses by corporations operating
outside their home jurisdiction were significant and widespread. A Harvard
report on 320 cases alleged to have occurred between 2005 and 2007 found
that the extractive industry accounted for the largest percentage of
allegations, followed by the retail and consumer product sector, the
pharmaceutical industry, the infrastructure and utility sector, and the food
and beverage industry.44 Alleged violations by clothing and sporting goods
companies had the most impact on workers, while the extractive community
had the most effect on communities.
While 60 percent of the adverse impacts were caused directly by
transnational companies, 40 percent were indirect impacts caused by third
parties such as suppliers, individuals, states, representatives of states, and
other businesses.45 The report concluded:
[T]he presence of all sectors and regions in the allegations supports the
need for all corporate actors to consider the human rights implications of
their activities. Moreover, the study indicates that the subject of this
consideration should not be a short-list of rights but actually the full range
of human rights. And given the number of allegations of indirect abuse,
firms should also consider the human rights records and activities of those
with whom they have relationships—the allegations show that a firm may
be held accountable by stakeholders where it contributes to or benefits
from third party abuses.46

Reports such as this were significant in the lead up to the release of the draft
Principles in 2008 that we discuss below.47 The lack of effective remedies
under this regime, however, was made clear in 2013 with the Rana Plaza
collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh.48 Bangladesh is the world’s second-largest
apparel exporting nation behind China, and the Rana Plaza building
contained several factories that manufactured clothing for companies from
Europe and the United States, including Bennetton, Bonmarché, Monsoon,
Mango, Matalan, Primark, and Walmart.49 When the factory caught fire on
April 24, 2013, 1129 people died, with another 2515 injured.50 More than

44. JOHN RUGGIE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, ADDENDUM: CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE
SCOPE AND PATTERNS OF ALLEGED CORPORATE-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 9 (2008).
45. See id. at 11. Of the direct impacts, 34 percent involved workers, 50 percent
involved communities, and 16 percent involved end-users such as consumers. See id. at 18.
Of the cases involving indirect impacts, about 60 percent affected workers, and 40 percent
affected communities. Id.
46. See id. at 4.
47. See infra Part II.C.1.
48. N.Y.U. STERN CTR. FOR BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, BUSINESS AS USUAL IS NOT AN
OPTION: SUPPLY CHAINS AND SOURCING AFTER RANA PLAZA (2014).
49. 2013 Savar Building Collapse, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_
Savar_building_collapse (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [http:// perma.cc/PE4D-SZVM].
50. Id.
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half of the victims were women, along with a number of their children who
were in nurseries within the building.51
The day before the collapse, a television news program showed cracks in
the building, and government authorities had requested an evacuation until
an inspection could be conducted. Later that day, however, the owner of
the factory declared that the building was safe and that workers should
return the next day. Some commentators argued that the decision by
managers to send workers back into the factories was due to pressure from
overseas companies to complete orders. The head of the Bangladesh Fire
Service & Civil Defense said that the upper four floors had been built
without a permit. The building’s architect noted that the building was
planned for shops and offices, not for factories.
One garment
manufacturer’s website indicated that the building had been built on a pond
without authorization and that substandard material was used during
construction, which led to an overload of the structure that was aggravated
by vibrations from generators in the building.
The disaster triggered large demonstrations and some rioting in
Bangladesh. In November, a ten-story garment factory that supplied
Western brands was allegedly burned down by workers angered over
rumors that a demonstrating worker had died from police fire. The
Bangladeshi government announced that new measures to ensure safety
would lead to the closure of several garment plants. Seven inspectors were
suspended and accused of negligence for renewing the licenses of garment
factories in the building. In June 2015, Bangladeshi police filed murder
charges in connection with the collapse against forty-two people, including
the owners of the building.
The International Labour Organization (ILO), in consultation with
government, industry, and labor representatives, investigated the collapse
and issued a set of recommendations. In addition to calling for
strengthening building and safety codes and practices, it emphasized the
importance of the Bangladeshi government passing legislation to “improve
protection, in law and practice, for the fundamental rights to freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining, as well as occupational
safety and health.”52
Of the twenty-nine brands identified as having sourced products from the
Rana Plaza factories, nine attended meetings in November 2013 to agree on
a proposal for compensation to the victims.53 By March 2014, seven of
these brands had contributed to the Rana Plaza Donor’s Trust Fund
compensation fund, which is backed by the ILO. In July 2013, a group of
seventeen major North American retailers that included Wal-Mart, Gap,
Target, and Macy’s announced the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
51. Id.
52. Conclusions of the ILO’s High Level Mission to Bangladesh, INT’L LABOR ORG.
(May 4, 2013), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/activities/statements-speeches/
WCMS_212463/lang--en/index.htm [http:// perma.cc/QF9D-69KJ].
53. Several companies refused to sign, including Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Mango, Auchan,
and Kik. The agreement was signed by Primark, Loblaw, Bonmarche, and El Corte Ingles.
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Safety54 (“the Alliance”). Members of the Alliance pledged funding of at
least $42 million for an inspection project, with some others promising
loans totaling $100 million to help finance necessary safety improvements.
Around the same time, seventy European companies announced an accord
under which they agreed to inspect all of the factories they use in
Bangladesh within nine months, develop plans to remedy problems that are
identified, and “ensure that sufficient funds are available to pay for
renovations and other safety improvements.”55 Some labor organizations
and NGOs praised the European program in contrast to the U.S. one, on the
ground that the former committed the companies to paying for whatever
improvements in the factories were necessary.56
As this event demonstrates, public and political pressure continue to be
brought to bear on transnational companies to fill the governance gap
existing around liability for human rights violations caused by their
operations, producers, and suppliers. Influential actors increasingly regard
the human rights impacts of business operations as not solely the
responsibility of the countries in which companies do business, but as an
issue of international concern requiring collaboration among a variety of
parties. As we discuss below, initiatives to deal with this gap are
developing. To date, however, none have imposed binding obligations or
liability on companies with respect to the human rights impacts of their
activities.
B. Key Governance Instruments
and Initiatives on Human Rights
While a range of legal approaches has been adopted with respect to
business and human rights, each involves its own distinct combination of
actors, procedures, and incentives. Some encourage companies to identify
and disclose voluntarily the impacts of their operations. Others involve
mandatory reporting requirements but do not prescribe specific conduct.
Still, others consist of private regulatory schemes to which companies can
voluntarily adhere. These approaches all tend to take the form of rules and
instruments that are not legally enforceable, but which still have the
potential to influence business reputation and credibility. Furthermore, as
some standards become more widely accepted, there is an increasing
likelihood that they will be incorporated into national law through common
law standards of care or government regulation.

54. The five-year initiative provides for participating companies to inspect within twelve
months the estimated five hundred Bangladeshi factories that the companies use and to
assess conditions based on a common safety standard. The companies then work with
factory owners, the government, and civil society groups to explore how to finance
necessary improvements. Steven Greenhouse & Stephanie Clifford, U.S. Retailers Offer
Plan for Safety at Factories, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/11/business/global/us-retailers-offer-safety-plan-for-bangladeshifactories.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E2AA-XBEF].
55. Id.
56. Id.
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All of these governance initiatives exist alongside or under the
international law framework that places responsibility on states to regulate
and protect human rights. The original document setting forth general
human rights principles is the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights57 (“the Declaration”). Two further UN covenants, namely the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights58 and the UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Convention on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights,59 together with the Declaration, constitute the
International Bill of Human Rights.60 States fulfill their responsibilities
under these and other treaties through the adoption of domestic law or
direct incorporation of the treaty in their domestic legal systems. While the
obligations set forth in the Declaration are directed to “every organ of
society,”61 the traditional perspective distinguishes between public and
private actors. As such, “The state is seen as the main entity responsible for
implementing programmes to reduce poverty, to promote human
development and generally to protect and promote human rights.”62
The International Bill of Human Rights has been supplemented by
additional UN treaties that elaborate upon prohibitions against racial
discrimination, discrimination against women, and torture. These treaties
also affirm the rights of children, migrant workers, and persons with
disabilities. In addition, the ILO has adopted conventions dealing with
workplace rights. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work63 (“the ILO Declaration”) lists freedom of association and
recognition of collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labor; abolition of child labor; and elimination of
discrimination with regard to employment and occupation.64 While the
next section discusses the major programs on the global level, there are a
variety of other initiatives that focus on specific issues or industries, with a
combination of public and private actors involved in their creation and
implementation.65

57. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
58. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
14688.
59. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
60. G.A. Res. 217 (III), International Bill of Human Rights (1966).
61. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, at 1.
62. See THE BUSINESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Aurora Voiculescu & Helen Yanacopulos
eds., 2011).
63. INT’L LABOUR ORG., DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT
WORK (1998).
64. See id.
65. For an excellent discussion of many of these, see SIMMONS & MACKLIN, supra note
41, at 79–177.
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C. The Leading Global Programs
1. The UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights
After decades of pressure to create a system of governance dealing with
business and human rights, the Principles were adopted in 2011 by the UN
Human Rights Council.66 The Principles are the product of a project
coordinated by Professor John Ruggie, acting as Special Representative of
the Secretary General of the UN.67 Since their adoption in 2011, the
Principles have gained acceptance as a useful framework for structuring
both governmental and business approaches to meeting human rights
obligations.
The Principles were preceded by the 2003 publication of Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (“the Norms”), which were
prepared by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights.68 The Norms provided that business enterprises, in addition
to states, were responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set
forth in the Declaration. The draft of the Norms elaborated that “[w]ithin
their respective spheres of activity and influence,” companies “have the
obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of
and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national
law.”69 The Norms thus imposed on companies a duty not only to respect
human rights, but also the same duties as states to promote and fulfill these
rights.
The Norms generated considerable controversy, and the UN Commission
on Human Rights ultimately declined to endorse them. Professor Ruggie
also explicitly rejected this approach at the outset of his project, stating that
“the divisive debate over the Norms obscures rather than illuminates
promising areas of consensus and cooperation among business, civil
society, governments and international institutions with respect to human
rights.”70 As a result, the Principles were organized around states’ existing
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental
freedoms; the role of business enterprises in complying with all applicable
laws and respecting human rights; and the need for rights and obligations to
be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached. The
66. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 2.
67. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
68. U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Draft
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug.
26, 2003).
69. Id.
70. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
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Principles thus rest on the notion of three core obligations (or pillars):
states are to protect human rights, businesses are to respect them, and both
are to provide appropriate remedies for their violation.
The responsibility to respect human rights requires businesses to avoid
infringing human rights and to address any adverse impacts “with which
they are involved.”71 The source of the rights is primarily the International
Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration. The commentary to the
Principles states: “The responsibility of business enterprises to respect
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement,
which remain defined largely by national law provisions in relevant
jurisdictions.”72 Furthermore, the responsibility “exists independently of
States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights
obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human
rights.”73 When national law conflicts with international human rights
principles, businesses “are expected to respect the principles of
internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible in
the circumstances.”74
The Principles provide that businesses must not cause or contribute to
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities and must also
seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts that are “directly linked to their
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they
have not contributed to those impacts.”75 The commentary to the Principles
states that “activities” include both actions and omissions and that business
relationships include those with “business partners, entities in its value
chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business
operations, products or services.”76
To meet their responsibilities, it is recommended that businesses have in
place a formal commitment to respect human rights, approved at the most
senior level of the company; a due diligence process to identify, prevent,
mitigate, and account for the company’s impact on human rights; and a
process to provide remedies for any adverse impacts they cause or to which
they contribute.77 In engaging in due diligence, it is recommended that
companies evaluate actual and potential violations—a process that should
include both reliance on experts and meaningful consultation with
potentially affected groups. They also should publicly communicate these
efforts to all stakeholders, including those on whom their business
operations may have an impact.
With respect to remedies, the Principles suggest that businesses establish
“operational-level grievance mechanisms” for those adversely affected by
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

UN Guiding Principles, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
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the companies’ operations.78 Such processes should be “[b]ased on
engagement and dialogue” with stakeholder groups for whose use they are
intended.79 Grievance procedures should be seen as legitimate, accessible,
predictable, equitable, transparent, consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and a source of continuous learning.
The European Union endorsed the Principles in its 2011 Corporate Social
Responsibility Strategy and is committed to support their implementation.80
The American Bar Association and the U.S. government also endorsed the
Principles,81 and the provisions have been incorporated into the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises82 (“the OECD Guidelines”) and the
To
International Finance Corporation’s Sustainability Framework.83
support the adoption of the Principles, the UN Human Rights Council
established a Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“the Working
Group”) to promote dissemination and implementation of the Principles.
The Working Group has encouraged states to meet their responsibility to
protect human rights by developing National Action Plans on Business and
Human Rights and has published guidance on how states should engage in
this process. As of February 2016, ten countries had completed plans,
nineteen were in the process of doing so (including the United States), and
civil society organizations had taken initial steps to develop plans in seven
other countries.84
A UN Working Group on the issue of business and human rights reported
to the General Assembly in May 2015 that the Principles have been
incorporated into frameworks of international organizations, regional
organizations, countries, industry bodies, and companies.85 While the
Principles are the most significant initiative to date that places
responsibility on businesses with respect to human rights impacts, other
initiatives operate alongside the Principles to create a broad framework of
transnational governance. None of these initiatives, however, create
widespread obligations on companies to address the human rights impacts
of their operations. This means that, as discussed in Part III below, lawyers

78. Id. at 31–32.
79. Id. at 34.
80. Corporate Social Responsibility: National Public Policies in the European Union
(2011).
81. ABA, Resolution 109 (endorsing the UN framework for business and human rights
and also the Principles and the OECD).
82. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (2011) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines], http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CJK-MJUP].
83. Int’l Fin. Corp. [IFC], IFC Sustainability Framework (2012).
84. State National Action Plans, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2016) [https://perma.cc/3885-CHUL].
85. Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 3–5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/28 (2015).
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advising corporate clients adopt a range of approaches to the relevance of
the governance framework on business and human rights.86
2. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The OECD Guidelines were established in 1976 and set forth principles
of good business practice that are consistent with applicable laws and
While the original OECD
internationally recognized standards.87
Guidelines focused on companies’ compliance with the law of the host
countries in which they do business, the current version places more
emphasis on international standards.88 This current version contains a
separate chapter on human rights and follows the framework of the
Principles. The OECD Guidelines provide that companies should respect
human rights and, at a minimum, should be guided by the International Bill
of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out
in the ILO Declaration.89
Similar to the Principles, the OECD Guidelines state that enterprises
should have a policy commitment to respect human rights; avoid causing or
contributing to adverse human rights impacts; seek ways to prevent or
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their
business operations, products, or services by a business relationship, even if
they do not contribute to those impacts; conduct due diligence to identify
risks of adverse human rights impacts that they might cause, or to which
they might contribute or be directly linked; and provide redress for human
rights violations for which they are responsible.90
The OECD Guidelines are voluntary and cannot be enforced against
multinational companies. They do, however, require participating states to
establish and fund National Contact Points (NCP) where complaints can be
filed by members of the public, NGOs, unions, and governments about
failure to comply with the OECD Guidelines.91 Participation in the
complaint process is voluntary. In general, the NCPs are expected to
provide consultation and assistance to companies accused of
noncompliance to help them conform their conduct to the OECD
Guidelines, although they are not able to monitor implementation of any
agreement that is reached through this process.
Since its establishment, the U.K.’s NCP has been especially active,
moving toward a quasi-judicial process that in some cases culminates in a
determination on whether a company has failed to comply with the OECD
Guidelines.92 Although it has no authority to impose changes on company
86. See infra Part III.
87. OECD Guidelines, supra note 82.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 32.
90. Id. at 19–20.
91. Id. at 68.
92. One such determination, for instance, involved a complaint about the United
Kingdom company, Afrimex, in connection with its operations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). The NCP found that Afrimex had violated the OECD Guidelines by

2016]

TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

2019

practice, the NCP does make recommendations on how companies can
improve their compliance with the OECD Guidelines. Not all NCPs have
assumed as active a role as in the United Kingdom, however, nor do many
have the resources to do so.
3. UN Global Compact
The UN Global Compact (“the Compact”) is a voluntary initiative
established in 2000 to provide a framework for companies to report their
efforts dealing with issues such as human rights, labor conditions, the
environment, and anticorruption.93 It is designed to serve as a “call to
companies to align strategies and operations with universal principles on
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, and take actions that
advance societal goals.”94 More than eight thousand businesses and four
thousand nonbusiness organizations have joined the Compact.95
Participants agree to abide by ten basic principles, which are derived from
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration, the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and the UN Convention
Against Corruption. The two principles that relate to human rights are that
businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally
proclaimed human rights and make sure they are not complicit in human
rights abuses.
Companies that are members of the Compact submit an annual report that
is posted on the UN website. A company must provide an explanation if it
is not reporting on any aspect of the Principles. Companies that meet the
minimum requirements are designated as “GC Active,” while those that go
beyond the minimum requirements by reporting on the company’s
implementation of advanced criteria and best practices qualify as “GC
Advanced.”96
If a participant does not submit a report that meets the minimum
requirements, it is given twelve months to resubmit, after which time it is
designated as “non-communicating” on the Compact website.97 If the
company then fails to submit a conforming report within twelve months, it
is expelled from the Compact and has to reapply.98 As of February 2016,

failing to apply sufficient pressure on its business partners to induce them to cease trading in
minerals where those sales provided revenues that funded the continuation of the war in that
country. FINAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL CONTRACT POINT FOR THE
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: AFRIMEX (UK) LTD. (2008).
93. Global Compact: The World’s Largest Corporate Sustainability Initiative, U.N.,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
H4W9-HDFB].
94. Id.
95. What Is a Global Compact?, U.N., https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/HWW4-QFDM].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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there were 1436 “non-communicating” participants and 6160 that had been
expelled.99
While the idea behind the Compact is that stakeholders will use the
information to assess and engage with companies on the issues discussed,
some observers have criticized it for failing to prescribe specific
requirements for participating companies and leaving it to them to
determine how to implement the broadly defined standards. The concern is
that companies may enhance their reputations simply by signing the
Compact without making serious commitments to operating in a sustainable
fashion. The extent to which the Compact has prompted changes in
behavior is also unclear. As one scholar concluded, “[As] the goal of the
[Compact] is to serve as a ‘learning platform,’ it is difficult to devise a
metric for measuring its impact, if any, on corporate behavior.”100
III. ADVISING BUSINESSES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
As discussed above, most initiatives aimed at increasing business
responsibility to respect human rights consist of nonbinding standards that
have few formal legal consequences.101 In particular, the rights that the
duty to respect is intended to protect under the Principles are contained in
advisory instruments that are unenforceable or in treaties that impose
obligations only upon nation-states. Furthermore, the rights in such
documents are expressed in very broad terms, such that the meaning may
vary considerably in different situations. The business duty to respect
human rights thus differs from conventional legal obligations on which
lawyers typically advise clients. What, if any, role does this leave for
lawyers with respect to this duty?
We looked for answers to this question in interviews with twenty-nine
persons involved in the business and human rights field. Two were senior
lawyers in corporate legal departments, while thirteen were in law firms.
Of those in law firms, six were mid-level partners or counsel, and seven
were senior partners or counsel. The remaining fourteen interviews were
with mid-level or senior people in organizations that focus or advise on
business and human rights. Eight interviews were conducted in person,
while the rest were conducted via telephone or Skype video. All interviews
were an hour or an hour-and-a-quarter. While the group does not represent
a random sample, it does consist of people with considerable expertise in
business and human rights. Their observations provide useful insights into
the dynamics that shape the business duty to respect human rights and
lawyers’ provision of advice on this duty.
The discussion below focuses on a number of factors that we found
influence lawyers’ willingness to advise on business and human rights. The
first is the nonbinding nature of human rights obligations, which can cause
reluctance and uncertainty for lawyers in approaching the issue. The
99. Id.
100. SIMMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 41, at 122.
101. See supra Part II.A.
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second is the different ways in which lawyers frame issues of human rights
to make them more relevant to their clients’ interests. Of the various
options available, the risk management lexicon was considered the most
effective in engaging clients on human rights issues. The final factor
affecting lawyers’ willingness to discuss human rights issues is the
relationship with inside counsel. As many interviewees commented, the
development of a framework to deal with the human rights impacts of
business activities is still in the early stages. This means that lawyers also
are in the early phase of determining how to raise these issues and what
these developments means for their sense of themselves as professionals.
A. Lawyer Reluctance
A common theme identified by interviewees was the reluctance by some
members of the bar to accept that lawyers should provide advice on
anything beyond enforceable legal provisions. One interviewee who works
with lawyers from various countries observed that there are some law firms
that tell their lawyers not to discuss the Principles “because they are not
law . . . my only job is to counsel you on what is the law.”102 Another said
that even for inside counsel, there is a lot of discomfort with human rights
because it is soft law. “When it gets to the general counsel’s office it [can]
get complicated because they’re lawyers and they feel much more
comfortable advising on hard law.”103 A key obstacle to lawyers providing
advice on human rights therefore is that these rights “started with
international standards and norms and things that lawyers don’t usually deal
with.”104
One expression of skepticism about lawyers’ role to advise on the
nonbinding duty to respect human rights was stated by Jonathan Goldsmith,
Secretary General of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe
(CCBE). Commenting on the International Bar Association (IBA)
guidance, Goldsmith questioned “whether it is useful for the IBA to publish
something where so many of the difficult questions remain unresolved.”105
He suggested that these questions include:




What does it mean to respect human rights when the role of
lawyers is to advise on respecting laws (which may not always
cover the human rights in question)?
What is the impact on the responsibility of lawyers—whether
legal or ethical—to their clients if they advise on human rights
rather than on the law?
Is there a distinction between advising clients about the existence
of human rights standards which go beyond the legal

102. Interview with Subject 21 [hereinafter Interview 21] (on file with the authors).
103. Interview with Subject 13 [hereinafter Interview 13] (on file with the authors).
104. Interview with Subject 25 [hereinafter Interview 25] (on file with the authors).
105. Jonathan Goldsmith, Business, Human Rights—and Meaning, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/comment-and-opinion/business-human
-rights-and-meaning/5047211.article [http:// perma.cc/6844-EK4F].
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requirement, and advising clients that they must comply with
those standards which go further than the law?106

Interviewers suggested that a second source of lawyer reluctance is that
some lawyers see advising on human rights as involving moral judgments
about their clients. As one lawyer noted:
[H]istorically lawyers have always been very comfortable in putting a
distance between us and the client’s commercial objectives: “We just
advise on the law, it’s not my role to question the client’s objectives.
Clearly if they are illegal I can’t be complicit and I may withdraw my
services, but if they want to sell tobacco products or mine uranium or
move a community [off its land] that’s entirely for the client to
decide.”107

Lawyers’ tendency to think in terms of legal compliance programs also
can create discomfort and uncertainty about their role with respect to the
Principles. One lawyer asked:
What tick do you have to put in what box to do the right thing? [F]or
example, . . . if you find that you have a supplier and may have child labor
in the supply chain, the old business approach to human rights before the
[Principles] would say, “Okay, stop using the supplier so you can say you
don’t have child labor in your supply chain.” But everyone knows now
that child labor is . . . a very complex issue and cutting those factories out
of your supply chain may actually bring harm to the people you’re trying
to protect. So the new idea with the [Principles] is even when you pull
out you have to think about what the human rights implications
are . . . . [I]t may be that your first step is to work with suppliers to try
and put the children in school, change the rules about suppliers, it’s a
whole process now that we need to go through. . . . [H]ow could you
express that in compliance terms?108

One lawyer who has worked with companies from several countries
suggested that U.S. lawyers’ advice tends to be driven more by
considerations of legal liability than does advice from lawyers in other
countries. She recalls one company turning to both French and U.S.
counsel for advice. French counsel “basically advised [the company] to
follow human rights principles.”109 By contrast, “the American legal
advice was very strongly [based on] legal liability: ‘Don’t do X, Y, or Z
even though people are asking you to do it; just follow your legal
liability.’”110 She suggested that in the United States, “[t]here is not a
whole lot of understanding or even respect for the UN Guidelines; I think
that’s in the legal culture.”111

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Interview 25, supra note 104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On the other hand, some interviewees suggested that lawyers from civil
law jurisdictions might be less receptive than those from common law
jurisdictions to the notion that a lawyer should advise on open-ended
standards in addition to formal legal provisions. One interviewee suggested
that the instinct in a civil law system is to say, “[H]ow do I think about what
salient human rights impacts are? [W]e need to elaborate exactly which
ones [we’re] talking about, exactly what sorts of actions and impacts, and
then I can deal with this.”112 Thus, the civil law lawyer will say, “We need
to write our own code and elaborate every potential human rights adverse
impact scenario [in sections] one through 510.”113
Another lawyer from a common law jurisdiction, however, questioned
whether the civil law system is quite this rigid. He suggested it depends on
the area of law involved:
If you are an administrative lawyer dealing with environmental law, you
tend to look at what the regulations provide, end of story. But when you
are dealing in a commercial context and you’re looking at negligence
lawsuits judges are permitted to look at standards. . . . I think that even in
the civil law it’s not quite as black and white as you might think. . . . A
German judge in a commercial dispute is entitled to look at standards
outside the law.114

Interviewees thus indicated that there is resistance in some quarters to
lawyers advising on human rights. There may even be some who are
unsure of how they would incorporate nonbinding standards into their
conversations with clients. Many interviewees, however, also suggested
that the main obstacle to providing such advice may be that many lawyers
simply are not familiar with the Principles.
B. Talking About Human Rights
The interviewees indicated that business clients differ in their awareness
of human rights responsibilities and the need for advice on them. Not
surprisingly, large multinational companies, those in the extractive
industries, and companies with global supply chains are most aware of the
human rights risks of their operations. In contrast, the companies that
appear to be least aware of human rights concerns are smaller national
companies that focus on domestic markets. Many of these national
companies, however, are part of the supply chains of multinational
businesses. Several interviewees suggested that this likely will be an
important impetus in increasing small and medium enterprise awareness of
human rights impacts.
Interviewees also suggested that lawyers find different ways to discuss
human rights issues with business clients. In general, the approach most
likely to resonate with clients is to focus on the potential risks to the
company of human rights violations. Clients vary, however, in how
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Interview 13, supra note 103.
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sensitive they are to different types of risks, which can range from the
prospect of legal liability to criticism from consumers, investors, or local
communities. Furthermore, the Principles state that human rights risk
analysis should focus on the risk to rights holders, not simply risk to the
company. This requires a shift in perspective. As a result, interviewees
expressed a range of opinions on how lawyers could best frame issues of
business and human rights with their clients.
C. The Risk Management Lexicon
Modern corporations spend a considerable amount of resources engaged
in “enterprise risk management,” which “include[s] not just risks associated
with accidental losses, but also financial, strategic, operational, and other
risks.”115 Human rights violations can create such risks, which makes
advising on how to prevent them seem like a natural topic to include in such
analysis. For this reason, the Principles suggest that “[h]uman rights due
diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk-management
systems.”116
D. Risk of Legal Liability
One risk on which lawyers traditionally advise is the risk of legal
liability. If we think of the type of issues on which lawyers may advise as a
set of concentric circles, the issue of legal liability constitutes the inner
circle. While there is some national regulation prohibiting egregious
conduct such as human trafficking, the liability of companies in developed
countries often depends on complex determinations of responsibility for the
actions of subsidiaries or contractual partners in developing countries. In
light of this, in many cases the most immediate concerns about direct
liability of major corporations tend to be based on compliance with
reporting and disclosure requirements.
Reporting and disclosure requirements generally do not restrict the
company’s operations, but simply require information about them.
Therefore, discussions about potential liability focus primarily on whether
the information is accurate. These discussions, however, have the potential
also to direct corporate attention to human rights issues in a couple of ways.
First, as one lawyer put it, “In order to get to the reporting outcome you
have to implement processes which will allow you to come up with the
information you need to report.”117 Assembling and analyzing the
information necessary to make disclosure can lead to more wide-ranging
conversations about corporate activities and the extent to which they risk
violating human rights.

115. Margaret Rouse, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Definition, TECH TARGET
(May 2010), http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/enterprise-risk-management [http://
perma.cc/QJR8-7MXZ].
116. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 2, at 18.
117. Interview with Subject 19 (on file with the authors).
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Second, disclosure can be a way of holding a company accountable to
stakeholders and the public at large, regardless of any potential legal
liability. Reporting provisions typically require a company to disclose its
efforts to avoid adverse human rights impacts. A company that discloses its
failure to make any efforts on human rights issues is likely to attract
criticism that could affect its standing with customers, investors, or officials
that may be in a position to grant or deny regulatory approvals.
Furthermore, where convergence around appropriate practices is starting to
emerge, companies that fail to adopt these practices are likely to be subject
to similar criticism and potential adverse action by stakeholders.
Discussions of compliance with reporting and disclosure requirements can
create opportunities for lawyers to advise companies on the broader risks of
human rights violations and the importance of minimizing them.
Finally, the potential for convergence around appropriate compliance and
reporting practices could have implications for corporate liability under the
common law or customary international law. Acceptance of certain
standards by a majority of companies in a given industry, for instance, or
those facing a common human rights risk, could lead to a judicial finding
that acting in accordance with these standards is required to meet the
appropriate tort law standard of care. As one lawyer put it, “The standard
of care is something that has evolved,” and there is “an expectation for
[companies within an industry] that if the industry comes up with a code of
conduct and you are not subscribing to that code of conduct something is
wrong with you.”118
The doctrines linking voluntary standards to legal liability are still in
their infancy and will require further elaboration. Lawyers performing the
core function of advising on potential legal liability will nonetheless need to
be attentive not only to statutory regulations, but also to evolving levels of
commitment to soft law that may eventually crystallize in common law
standards of conduct.
E. Legal Risks of Nonbinding Standards
Lawyers may also advise on nonbinding standards when they are
incorporated into legal documents, such as contracts with suppliers, joint
venture partners, and creditors. Compliance with these standards therefore
becomes a legal obligation that is a condition of entry into and performance
under these various agreements. In the former case, failure to credibly
demonstrate conformity with the standards may result in an inability to
obtain financing for a project or foreclose the opportunity to enter into a
potentially profitable business arrangement. In the latter case, violation of
the standards may require indemnification of a contractual partner or
authorize termination of the contract.
If the contractual partner is a host state, acceptance of standards may be a
condition of bidding for a project, or violation of them may result in denial
of approval or termination of the project. Companies in developing
118. Interview with Subject 17 [hereinafter Interview 17] (on file with the authors).
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countries are now being encouraged to insist on protection of human rights
and other assurances in investor agreements, with an increasing roster of
lawyers and consultants providing assistance to them in negotiating and
implementing agreements with such terms.
Lawyers who act for companies that are parties to agreements that
contain such standards need to advise their clients about the extent to which
they may be in compliance or breach. As with discussions about potential
legal liability, such conversations can be the impetus for evaluating and
strengthening a company’s processes for avoiding various types of adverse
human rights impacts. As one lawyer put it, this can impress upon clients
“the need to be proactive and not simply react as issues or controversies
arise.”119
In addition, some government entities that are not contractual partners
with a company may use information about the company’s failure to
comply with nonbinding standards as the basis for adverse action. Canada,
for instance, provides that its Export Credit Agency is authorized to deny or
terminate funding for a Canadian mining company that refuses to
participate in an OECD NCP process initiated in response to a complaint
against the company.120 More generally, it is not hard to imagine that a
government agency that is deciding whether to issue a regulatory approval
of some sort may well take into account a company’s record on human
rights issues.
Advising on the potential legal risks of failure to comply with human
rights standards thus involves the lawyer in traditional legal counseling that
can create the opportunity to expand awareness of the impacts of a
company’s activities. One lawyer expressed impatience with the notion that
advising on soft law is any different from what lawyers regularly do in
other contexts:
A client sends me their code of conduct or their business ethics policy and
says, “Well, do you think we’ve got a problem here?” And the oil and gas
mining sector or the telecommunications or electricity sector have got a
bunch of codes and . . . template agreements dictated or agreed between
the sector. And lawyers quite happily interpret those documents, even
though they’ve got no more standing from a national law perspective than
any other documents.121

F. Nonbinding Standards As Hard Law in Waiting
Transnational businesses operate in a world of considerable uncertainty.
One significant source of uncertainty involves which regulatory provisions
are likely to be imposed in the future, or what contract terms counterparties
may request or financial institutions may require. Lawyers who advise on
nonbinding standards are in a position to offer some insight into these
questions, thereby enabling clients to anticipate and plan for legal
119. Interview with Subject 9 (on file with the authors).
120. Interview 25, supra note 104.
121. Interview with Subject 3 (on file with the authors).
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requirements that may emerge down the road. As one lawyer succinctly
stated, “Soft law can be hard law in waiting. The law is a lagging indicator
of what’s considered ethical, so that what may be considered unethical
today may be illegal tomorrow.”122 Another captured this idea by saying
that nonbinding standards also include the “unspoken expectations of the
public.”123
Many lawyers drew analogies to the early days of concern about
environmental issues. There was very little hard law, and when “naming
and shaming” proved ineffective, the government “pick[ed] the practices of
the most . . . progressive companies and use[d] that as the basis for what [it]
impose[d] on everybody else.”124 These voluntary practices were an
important foundation for the numerous environmental statutes that
eventually followed.
This perspective suggests that a lawyer who discusses nonbinding
standards with a client is advising on the “law” in an expansive sense that is
sensitive to the fluid relationship among ethics, norms, and formal law. She
is attempting to provide a client not simply with a snapshot, but a moving
picture.
G. Business Risk: The Social License
The preceding types of risks to a business arising from the human rights
impacts of its operations can all be conceptualized in terms of gradually
expanding concentric circles of legal risk. It may be, however, that in some
cases there is no plausible basis for conceptualizing the human rights risk to
the company as falling within one of these circles. At the same time, there
may be other types of risks that are relevant to the client’s business. Is
there any role for the lawyer in advising on such risks? Lawyers may not
be able to claim any particular professional expertise with respect to them.
At the same time, many of these risks will reflect stakeholder and public
perception that the company has violated common ethical norms. This is a
matter with respect to which a lawyer may have insight because of the
broad relationship between such norms and the law. Many lawyers
traditionally have fulfilled this role by acting as a client’s trusted advisor.
To the extent that they act in this role, lawyers will bring to the client’s
attention the various types of business risks that may result from imposing
adverse human rights impacts.
Advising on these risks requires an appreciation of the kinds of resources
and support that the client needs to be successful and the extent to which
violating human rights may jeopardize them. Such risks may exist even
when a company is in compliance with national law. One lawyer provided
an example involving a project that required moving an indigenous
community:

122. Interview 13, supra note 103.
123. Interview 17, supra note 118.
124. Id.
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There is under the national legislation an ability to move the
community . . . but the compensation is very nominal and de minimis, and
there is no right to have the decision reviewed. We would say, “Well
look, there is clearly a national law that deals with this, but from the
United Nations Guiding Principles perspective you would also want to
raise with the client perhaps the difference between the national law
standard and international human rights standards.” [Under the latter] you
would expect a reasonable level of compensation and a review process or
a grievance mechanism for those who were unhappy with the decision.125

The lawyer continued:
And you might try and explain why you are raising these issues with the
client because they are not legal issues. In other words, the client will ask
the question, “What can I do?” They are not interested in what else can I
not do or should I be doing. To that you can say, “Well, have you thought
about from a business perspective the potential disruption, will there be
protests, what’s this going to cost in terms of project delay, the impact to
your reputation when you are on the front page of all the local
newsletters, when perhaps you’ve got to go before a government
commission and you want an approval for another project in two or three
years’ time?”126

Lawyers provided many other examples of business risk in our
discussions. A telecommunications company, for instance, may operate in
a country in which an authoritarian government is facing pressure from
dissidents who are mobilizing the population. The government might
respond with violence and request all transnational companies operating in
the country to disable access to social media in order to reduce the prospect
that further demonstrations will endanger its grip on power. What should a
company do? A lawyer can inform the company of what the national law
says about the authority of the government to issue such demands; but are
there other considerations that go beyond the legality of the order that the
company should consider? On the one hand, failure to comply with the
demand may well jeopardize the ability of the company to operate in that
country—at least if the current regime remains in power. On the other, will
there be an outcry by the international community that the company is
complicit in abuses by the regime?
Less dramatically, a transnational company may be in a position to
negotiate an investment agreement with a developing country that gives the
company a lion’s share of the profits from a project. The contract also
could severely constrain the government from enacting any legislation that
could impair the value of the project, which could include changes in tax
law or worker health and safety regulation. Should the company capitalize
on its bargaining position to obtain the best possible terms under the
contract? Or should it accept a more equitable allocation of rights and
obligations that generates more commitment by the host country and

125. Interview with Subject 2-3 [hereinafter Interview 2-3] (on file with the authors).
126. Id.
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provides a more sustainable social and economic environment for the
company over the thirty-year life of the project?
In both of these instances, compliance with national or local law will not
necessarily insulate a company from criticism. Depending upon the issue,
there may be emerging international expectations of ethical behavior to
which the public may hold a company. These expectations are the basis of
what some observers have called a company’s “social license.”127 This
license reflects the public’s sense of the legitimacy of a company’s
operations. One lawyer suggested that, with respect to human rights
impacts, “you certainly look at the risk of legal violations but you also look
at the risk of what happens when you violate soft law global norms because
that can cause all kinds of problems that can ultimately lead to the loss of a
company’s social . . . license to operate.”128
The likelihood that a company will be held accountable for breaching
accepted public norms has increased substantially in recent years with
advances in telecommunications technology and the rise of international
NGOs and other significant actors in the transnational sphere. One
interview subject said that lawyers need to advise clients that “[p]eople are
in touch with each other and NGOs are out there. [There are] a lot of forces
at work that did not exist ten or twenty years ago. The impacts on people
can lead to serious consequences.”129
Discussion of business risks can also assist companies in gaining greater
certainty about their operations. In the face of what can seem to be
amorphous and open-ended obligations with respect to human rights,
companies may find that reliance on global standards provides them with
greater predictability in their activities. Thus, a company may agree to
adopt international standards on community consultation with respect to
extractive projects or agree to abide by the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights with respect to the use of security services. Once this
occurs, the dynamics that we have described above can begin to hold a
company accountable in a variety of ways for its commitment to such
standards. In this way, conversations with clients about business risks may
set in motion a process that can protect human rights apart from a
company’s concerns about its legal risks.
A lawyer who advises a client on risks to its social license is not acting as
a decision maker with respect to such risks. Rather, her role is to ensure
that the client is aware of these considerations in deciding how to proceed.
Corporate management increasingly looks to both outside and inside
counsel for advice on the full range of risks that a company faces. As a
scholar and corporate general counsel observed, “[L]egally astute top
management teams take a proactive approach to legal matters. They bring
counsel in early to assist not only in assessing legal risk but also in creating
a strategy and a plan of execution that maximizes realizable value while
127. GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 13; MORRISON, supra note 13.
128. Interview 13, supra note 103.
129. Interview 17, supra note 118.
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eliminating any unnecessary legal or business risks.”130 Serving as the
company’s lawyer requires contacts with persons throughout the
organization, which can put inside counsel in a position to identify and
analyze risks and opportunities across the full range of a company’s
operations. This feature of the job, along with lawyers’ traditional training
in identifying and assessing risk, is resulting in more companies turning to
lawyers for wide-ranging advice.
IV. BEYOND LEGAL AND BUSINESS RISK
Focusing on expanding concentric circles of risk is a way to include
human rights concerns within the enterprise risk assessments that an
increasing number of companies are already performing. Simultaneously,
this focus on risks to the company is analytically distinct from an emphasis
on risks to rights holders. As the Principles emphasize, human rights due
diligence needs to “go[] beyond simply identifying and managing material
risks to the company itself, to include risks to rights-holders.”131 In keeping
with this, the Principles also say, “Where it is necessary to prioritize actions
to address actual and potential adverse human rights impacts, business
enterprises should first seek to prevent and mitigate those that are most
severe or where delayed response would make them irremediable.”132 This
part discusses how business lawyers may be most effective in encouraging
their clients to adopt this perspective.
A. Risks to Rights Holders
It is understandable that lawyers attempting to minimize the adverse
impact on human rights of business activities would tend to stress the risks
to the company of imposing such limits. Businesses generally operate in
highly competitive environments. Impacts on human rights thus may be
most likely to enter into deliberations when they can be framed as potential
costs to the company. As a pragmatic matter, an effective way to minimize
risks to rights holders can be to persuade management to minimize risks to
the company, because this aligns the interest of the latter with the former.
Such an approach reflects the view that outcomes are more important
than motives in assessing behavior. Philosopher Robert Goodin, for
instance, suggests that simply identifying the moral dimension of an issue
will not necessarily suffice to motivate changes in behavior (or need
prompting concern with that dimension be considered the only measure of
success). As Goodin observes, most actions “probably proceed from a
multiplicity of motives, some good and some bad . . . . So in a way it does

130. Constance Bagley & Mark Roellig, The Transformation of General Counsel: Setting
the Strategic Legal Agenda 3 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201246 [https://perma.cc/WJ4X-M675].
131. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 2, at 18.
132. Id. at 26.
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not really even make very much sense to expect a conclusive answer to the
question, ‘What motive[s] lay behind that act?’”133
Consistent with this pragmatic approach, several lawyers who professed
strong commitment to advancing business respect for human rights
emphasized that their focus is on finding practical ways to reduce risks to
rights holders rather than ensuring the purity of clients’ motives. As one
lawyer put it: “If I can show them a way where they can make money and
at the same time not . . . violate someone’s human rights that will allow
them to continue to operate and at the same time give relief to these victims,
then I’ve done my job.”134 Another lawyer who described herself as
“passionate” about human rights issues commented, “I don’t think as a
business community we’ve reached [a] tipping point” such that companies
consider human rights impacts from a purely altruistic perspective.135 As a
result,
I think any conversation has to involve a reference to what value that
client would see in this kind of proposition. It might be as a shareholder
or it might be at governance level, so it might be more of a management
kind of issue than a profit issue. But there has to be some kind of a
sale.136

At the same time, focusing on risk to the company will not necessarily
always align the interests of the company and those affected by its actions.
For instance, affected rights holders may not be in a position to exert
pressure on a company that will affect its financial condition or its
reputation with stakeholders such as customers, investors, or government
regulators. The Principles, for instance, declare that companies should set
priorities based on human rights risks and based on the severity of the
potential adverse impacts. One lawyer, however, expressed skepticism that
companies actually do this: “I don’t know one company that actually
prioritizes in that way. Because they prioritize based on where the squeaky
wheels are and where the company is going to get bit.”137
A company that acts based on cost-benefit calculations thus may leave
rights holders vulnerable to the possibility that in any given instance, the
calculation will not favor taking their interests into account. As Goodin
puts it, “We want to get people to do the right thing regularly and
systematically, and the surest way to do that simply has to be to get them to
do the right thing for the right reason.”138 The best way to get a company
to minimize risks therefore is for managers genuinely to be concerned about
the persons who will be affected if those risks materialize. When this
occurs, people treat rights as a hard constraint that is not contingent on costbenefit calculations.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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ROBERT GOODIN, MOTIVATING POLITICAL MORALITY 9 (1992).
Interview 21, supra note 102.
Interview with Subject 10 [hereinafter Interview 10] (on file with the authors).
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Interview 25, supra note 104.
GOODIN, supra note 133, at 9.
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The challenge for business lawyers thus in effect is how to help inculcate
a deontological perspective in clients who operate in a domain dominated
by consequentialist thinking. The lawyers we interviewed acknowledged
the difficulty of this task, but some held out hope that it could succeed. For
instance, while risk management is a natural vehicle for discussions about
the risks of adverse human rights impacts, these discussions do not
necessarily sharply distinguish between the risks to the company and to the
rights holders. Even simply considering whether violations may occur that
represent risks to the company requires imagining the reactions of average
persons who are guided by the standards of ordinary morality. This process
of taking the perspective of persons outside the company requires
imaginative evaluation of the company’s operations according to moral
considerations rather than simply self-interest. That evaluation may
initially be for the purpose of determining whether public moral reactions
will result in criticism of the company. It seems plausible to imagine,
however, that the habit of consulting ordinary morality will lead to moral
standards being a direct, rather than derivative, influence on behavior.
A second point is that it can be perilous for a company to try to
differentiate between adverse human rights impacts that will and will not
generate public criticism. Social media has the potential to direct
worldwide attention to an incident that occurs in a remote part of the world,
and international NGOs have the capacity to generate ongoing campaigns
that exert pressure on companies by alerting a variety of stakeholders. This
makes it prudent for a company to assume that every risk to rights holders
is a risk to the company, which means that the best approach is to focus
directly on potential victims.
We can gain some insight into the possibilities for changes in business
client perspectives from what has been called a “constructivist” approach to
international relations. That approach challenges the realist view that actors
in the international realm operate on the basis of interests that are
exogenous to norms and law and that it is these interests, rather than
normative or legal considerations, that determine their behavior.139
Constructivists argue for the importance of conceptualizing actors as
members of social and discursive communities whose conceptions of their
own interest may be reshaped by participation in such communities.140
Interests, in other words, are endogenous to norms and law.
This suggests that increasing attention to and discussion of the human
rights impacts of business activities could gradually change companies’
understandings of their identities and interests. Some companies already,
for instance, purport to distinguish themselves as socially responsible.
Even if this self-presentation initially is meant to serve instrumental
financial interests, it creates an identity to which persons both inside and
outside the company can hold it accountable. A constructivist perspective
139. See J. SAMUEL BARKIN, REALIST CONSTRUCTIVISM: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (2010).
140. For a useful comparison and synthesis of the realist and constructivist perspectives,
see id.
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suggests that interaction among actors has the potential to solidify this
corporate identity, so that it serves as a motivation for acting in socially
responsible ways. To the extent this occurs, what is in the interest of rights
holders is in the interest of the company—not because of cost-benefit
analysis, but because a particular conception of identity has been
internalized in the company culture.
Ultimately, it may be unrealistic to imagine that companies will focus on
the risks of adverse human rights impacts without ever considering their
impact on their own economic viability. As one lawyer put it, counsel
needs to emphasize that establishing priorities is about focusing on “the risk
to humans, not to the company,” but “[i]t’s probably always going to be
some sort of balance, because at the end of the day the people who make the
decisions are looking at income. So what you can hope for is some sort of
balance.”141
B. The Role of Inside Counsel
Another dynamic that shapes the likelihood and nature of lawyers’ advice
on human rights issues is the relationship between inside and outside
counsel. Inside counsel have gained significant influence over the past few
decades, and several interviewees saw them as crucial in sensitizing
companies to the need to consider the human rights impacts of their
operations. One law firm lawyer commented: “The in-house counsel [role]
has changed. They are starting to see . . . that they have a broader remit
[that] may mean interacting with human rights issues.”142
Their crucial role within the company thus means that “internal counsel
are really the key to unlocking this for external counsel, giving them a level
of comfort and confidence about raising [human rights] issues with
clients.”143 Internal counsel who seek to raise awareness of these issues
within companies can enlist outside counsel to play certain roles in support
of such an effort. Outside counsel can be in a position, for instance, to
describe what other companies in an industry are doing with respect to
human rights impacts, including commitments to adhere to certain
voluntary standards. They also can provide in-depth analysis of potential
human rights issues based on familiarity with how standards are being
interpreted and applied. Additionally, they may be especially wellpositioned to advise on which standards are likely to be incorporated into
hard law. These roles reflect the fact that general counsel typically must be
generalists who attend to a wide range of issues, while outside counsel often
develop more focused expertise. This can enable outside counsel to provide
valuable support by reinforcing inside counsel initiatives. As one law firm
lawyer put it, “Our job is to help that person within the company who is

141. Interview 25, supra note 104.
142. Interview 2-3, supra note 125.
143. Id.
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trying to drive change and give them as many arrows in their quiver as we
can.”144
To what extent are outside counsel likely to be the ones to initiate
discussions of human rights, rather than respond to inside counsel requests
for advice? There was a divergence of opinion among our interviewees on
how likely this is and on the extent to which it is the lawyer’s role to do so.
As one lawyer stated,
Normally the relationship between the lawyer and the client is such that
the lawyer reacts to what the client wants and that’s kind of it. . . . A
lawyer has to be very, very careful when he or she starts trying to
persuade a client to do something that the client isn’t already inclined to
do . . . . He can easily become labeled a troublemaker, an idealist,
someone who is off the program if [he is] not careful.145

At the same time, outside counsel may take the initiative because she
wants to be seen as a trusted advisor rather than simply a purveyor of
technical services. As one lawyer noted, “It’s much more valuable when a
firm becomes . . . a wise counselor than if it’s just a commodity provider of
specialized services. . . . I think outside counsel want to be able to
understand how they can provide that wise counsel.”146 Another lawyer
echoed this point:
[T]he climate for outside counsel lawyer is so competitive you need to
have an advantage . . . . What differentiates you is what extra value you
[are] bringing. If you are a lawyer who knows about these principles,
who understands them, who can translate that into language that your
client can (a) appreciate and (b) profit from, you are going to be at an
advantage . . . . You can convey the information and they can take that
information and use it to build their business. You provide a service . . . a
valuable service.147

Outside counsel also may come to see herself as having a professional
responsibility to raise concerns about human rights impacts. The IBA
guidance says: “[A]dvising business clients on how to manage their legal
risks by preventing and mitigating their involvement in negative human
rights impacts falls within a lawyer’s ethical obligations under the IBA
International Principles [on Conduct for the Legal Profession].”148 Rule 1.1
of the European Bar’s Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European
Community states that a lawyer’s ethical obligations include those that she
owes to “the public for whom a free and independent profession . . . is an
essential means of safeguarding human rights in the face of the power of the
state and other interests in society.”149 The American Bar Association’s
144. Interview with Subject 15 (on file with the authors).
145. Interview 17, supra note 118.
146. Interview 13, supra note 103.
147. Interview 21, supra note 102.
148. INT’L BAR ASS’N, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDANCE FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS
33 (2015).
149. EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS r.1.1 (COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS
2013).
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report accompanying its resolution endorsing the Principles, for instance,
stated:
It bears noting here that ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1
may well apply in this context. It requires lawyers to exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice and permits
them to refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s
situation.
This imperative logically would include applicable
international standards in the conduct of a client’s affairs, including the
Framework and Guiding Principles where corporate clients are
concerned.150

The reference in Rule 2.1 to discussing considerations beyond law is
framed in discretionary rather than mandatory terms.151 This means that
perceptions of what constitutes “law” will have an important bearing on the
scope of the lawyer’s duty under Rule 2.1 and similar professional
standards. One lawyer did suggest, however, that the day may come when
a lawyer’s failure to advise a client of the potential risks to the company
arising from, say, local opposition to a project could lead the client to allege
that the lawyer failed to provide adequate advice.152 The fluid relationship
among international norms, standards, and hard law thus may have the
potential to reshape understandings of the lawyer’s role.
Finally, law firms conducting human rights due diligence may result in
occasions for lawyers to initiate discussions of the impacts of client
activities. The IBA guidance states that law firms as businesses can be
expected to meet the responsibility to respect human rights in all of their
activities (including in their employment of lawyers) and in their business
relationships, both with other law firms and business enterprises such as
suppliers, and in the services they provide to their clients. Law firms that
fail to respect human rights can therefore expect to be increasingly
exposed to similar legal and non-legal risks as other businesses that also
fail to do so.153

In order to meet its obligation, a law firm “needs to assess whether there
are any actual or potential human rights impacts that may be directly linked
to the firm’s services for a client.”154 The IBA guidance suggests that a
firm may be seen as contributing to an client’s adverse human rights impact
“when it provides services to enable the client to take actions that are legal
(or at least not clearly illegal), but which the firm knows, or ought to know
in the exercise of reasonable due diligence, will result in adverse impacts on
human rights.”155
A firm that has such a due diligence process in place to avoid
contributing to human rights violations could make it easier for its lawyers
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

ABA, supra note 81, at 5 n.16.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
Interview with Subject 8 [hereinafter Interview 8] (on file with the authors).
INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 148.
Id.
Id. at 58.
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to initiate discussions of human rights issues with clients by enabling the
lawyers to say that they are simply following standard firm policy. The
extent to which firms are willing to put such a process in place may vary,
however. First, firms may contest the assumption that they should be
regarded as contributing to a client’s human rights violations in any
instance in which they are simply providing advice on what conduct
complies with the law. The traditional view of the lawyer’s role as a neutral
partisan is that representation of a client “does not constitute an
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or
activities.”156 On this view, the lawyer is not morally accountable for how
the client chooses to use her advice as long as the lawyer does not counsel
or assist the client in conduct that the lawyer knows is “criminal or
fraudulent.”157
Some lawyers we interviewed, however, suggested that the standard
conception of the lawyer’s role may not be as persuasive when a lawyer is
acting in an advisory capacity, as opposed to when she is engaged in
litigation. Indeed, some lawyers stated that they themselves do not accept
this concept in the advisory context.158 This is because an advisor can be a
vital partner in helping a client imagine and pursue a specific course of
action, as opposed to a litigator who encounters the client’s conduct after
the fact and attempts to fashion the best explanation for it.159 The advisor
thus arguably bears more responsibility for the behavior of the client than
does the litigator.
Second, a firm may be reluctant to establish a due diligence process
because it fears that doing so may strain relationships with current and
prospective clients who may regard the firm as passing moral judgment on
their activities. A due diligence process therefore will need to be widely
adopted among law firms in order to avoid this potential competitive
disadvantage. Otherwise, “people are just cutting themselves out of the
market in order to have somebody else pick up that work.”160 This suggests
that there may be a collective action problem among firms; none may want
to risk being disadvantaged by being the first to inaugurate human rights
due diligence, even though firms would be better off if all agreed to do so.
The market dynamics by which firms may overcome this obstacle would
require analysis beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important to
recognize the challenge.
CONCLUSION
A lawyer’s willingness and opportunity to advise business clients on the
nonbinding elements of the duty to respect human rights is likely to vary.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
157. Id. r. 1.2(d).
158. See Interview with Subject 4 (on file with the authors); Interview with Subject 5 (on
file with the authors); Interview 8, supra note 152.
159. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 SO. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994).
160. Interview 10, supra note 135.
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Advising on soft law that may have hard law consequences is the role with
which lawyers are most likely to be comfortable and is an activity that falls
within the core of their traditional professional responsibilities. Some
lawyers may be uncomfortable with moving beyond that core to focus on
broader concerns. At the same time, many major corporations now expect
general counsel to provide an assessment of the full range of risks that the
company may face. The pervasiveness of social media and the activities of
NGOs can make potential adverse human rights impact a significant risk for
some companies. This suggests that inside counsel—at least in major
companies—may increasingly attend to this risk. It remains to be seen
whether an established role for outside counsel will emerge from this
process. As many interview subjects commented, we are in the early phase
of attention to the human rights impacts of business activities. This means
that lawyers also are in the early phase of determining what these
developments will mean for their sense of themselves as professionals.
The emergence of a transnational governance regime in general, and
efforts to minimize adverse human rights impacts from business activities
in particular, challenge conventional understandings of what constitutes law
and regulation. They reflect a dynamic process that involves complex
interaction among informal norms, public expectations, voluntary
standards, economic incentives, and codified rules of behavior. The
different spheres of activity that constitute this regime each have the
potential to establish a variety of expectations based on cosmopolitan
values that may trump compliance with national or local legal requirements.
The spheres also have the potential to impose sanctions that are distinct
from legal liability. This state of affairs can create uncertainty for
transnational companies with respect to the standards of behavior to which
they will be held accountable.
Lawyers may be in a position to help business clients reduce this
uncertainty by advising on how companies can minimize the risks of human
rights violations.
This Article has suggested that some lawyers’
conceptions of law and regulation may create reluctance to assume this role.
However, this Article also explored the ways in which some lawyers are
finding occasions to embrace it and framing their advice to clients when
they do. All the subjects we interviewed expressed the view that attention
to business and human rights is gaining significant momentum that is
unlikely to abate. It remains to be seen whether and how business lawyers
will accept what could be an opportunity to integrate their roles as
representatives of clients and as professionals with some responsibility for
the public good.

